A Stusy of Economic Impact Effects of Agricultural Investment on Taiwan: Static and Dynamic Input-Output Analysis
A Study on the Affecting Factors of Participation on the Policy of Payments of Environmental Services: Landowners' Perspectives
This study investigates the double dividend from an organic agriculturalproduct label and looks at a real case to illustrate the influence an organicagricultural product label has on social welfare. Our model structure takeson two agricultural product suppliers that decide whether to adopt organicfarming or not in order to obtain an organic agricultural product label. Ifthe agricultural product supplier uses nitrogen fertilizer for farming, then itemits Nitrous Oxide (N2O), which is a greenhouse gas (GHG). At thistime, the social planner decides to reduce the amount of N2O emissions inorder to maximize social welfare. We conclude that the regulation of anorganic agricultural product label can cut N2O emissions and promoteconsumer surplus. In other words, setting up an organic agriculturalproduct label creates a double dividend effect. The Agricultural Researchand Extension Station, Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan is the mainunit of research and development (R&D) in agricultural farming technologyin Taiwan. By technology transfer and licensing, it can sufficiently helpreduce a private firm’s R&D cost in agricultural farming technology.Since there are two large-size rice suppliers in Taiwan, but only onesupplier has its own organic paddy field and does organic farmingtechnology R&D, social welfare in this area has room for improvement.
This study focuses on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs),examining a North/South model in which market segmentation isincomplete. We investigate the way in which the existence of arbitrageaffects the incentives of the two countries to set their appropriate durationof patent protection. Our results show that the North has no incentive tocompletely eliminate arbitrage after patents have expired in the South,despite the fact that enforcement may be costless. The results also revealthat if the demand function for an innovation is linear, then a noncooperativegame of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists between theNorth and the South. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a uniform universalstandard for IPR protection will never achieve global Pareto efficiency whenmarkets are not perfectly segmented.